LIPIcs by Chatterjee, Krishnendu et al.
Strategy Complexity of Concurrent Safety Games∗
Krishnendu Chatterjee1, Kristoffer Arnsfelt Hansen2, and Rasmus
Ibsen-Jensen3
1 IST Austria, Klosterneuburg, Austria
krish@ist.ac.at
2 Aarhus University, Aarhus, Denmark
arnsfelt@cs.au.dk
3 IST Austria, Klosterneuburg, Austria
ribsen@ist.ac.at
Abstract
We consider two player, zero-sum, finite-state concurrent reachability games, played for an infinite
number of rounds, where in every round, each player simultaneously and independently of the
other players chooses an action, whereafter the successor state is determined by a probability
distribution given by the current state and the chosen actions. Player 1 wins iff a designated goal
state is eventually visited. We are interested in the complexity of stationary strategies measured
by their patience, which is defined as the inverse of the smallest non-zero probability employed.
Our main results are as follows: We show that: (i) the optimal bound on the patience of
optimal and -optimal strategies, for both players is doubly exponential; and (ii) even in games
with a single non-absorbing state exponential (in the number of actions) patience is necessary.
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1 Introduction
Concurrent reachability games
Concurrent reachability games[8] are played on finite-state graphs by 2 players for an infinite
number of rounds. In every round, each player simultaneously and independently of the other
player chooses moves (or actions). The current state and the chosen moves of the players
determine a probability distribution over the successor state. The result of playing the game
(or a play) is an infinite sequence of states and actions. The play starts in a designated
start state. Player 1 wins the play iff the play ever enters a designated goal state. We say
that player 1 is the reachability player and player 2 the safety player. These games were
introduced in a seminal work by Shapley [23], and have been one of the most fundamental
and well-studied game models in stochastic graph games. Matrix games (or normal form
games) can model a wide range of problems with diverse applications, when there is a finite
number of interactions [19, 26]. Concurrent reachability games can be viewed as a finite set
of matrix games, such that the choices made in the current game determine which game is
played next, and is the appropriate model for many applications [11]. Moreover, in analysis
of reactive systems, concurrent games provide the appropriate model for reactive systems
with components that interact synchronously [6, 7, 1].
∗ Some proofs are missing. See full version https://arxiv.org/abs/1506.02434, [4]
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Relevance
Concurrent reachability games are relevant in many applications. For example, the synthesis
problem in control theory (e.g., discrete-event systems as considered in [22]) corresponds
to reactive synthesis of [21]. The synthesis problem for synchronous reactive systems is
appropriately modeled as concurrent games [6, 7, 8]. Other than control theory, concurrent
reachability games also provide the appropriate model to study several other interesting
problems, such as two-player poker games [18].
Properties of strategies
Given a concurrent reachability games, the player-1 value v1(s) of the game at a state s is
the limit probability with which he can guarantee that the play will eventually enter the
goal state against all strategies of player 2. The player-2 value v2(s) is analogously the
limit probability with which player 2 can ensure his own objective against all strategies of
player 1. Concurrent reachability games are determined [10], i.e., for each state s we have
v1(s) + v2(s) = 1. A strategy for a player, given a history (i.e., finite prefix of a play) specifies
a probability distribution over the actions. A stationary strategy does not depend on the
history, but only on the current state. For ε ≥ 0, a strategy is ε-optimal for a state s for
player i if it ensures his own objective with probability at least vi(s)− ε against all strategies
of the opponent. A 0-optimal strategy is an optimal strategy. In concurrent reachability
games, there exist stationary optimal strategies for the safety player [20, 14]; whereas in
contrast, for the reachability player, optimal strategies do not exist in general, however, for
every ε > 0 there exists stationary ε-optimal strategies [10].
The significance of patience and roundedness of strategies
The basic decision problem is as follows: given a concurrent reachability game and a rational
threshold λ, decide whether v1(s) ≥ λ. The basic decision problem is in PSPACE and
is square-root sum hard [9]1. Given the hardness of the basic decision problem, the next
most relevant computational problem is to compute an approximation of the value. The
computational complexity of the approximation problem is closely related to the size of the
description of ε-optimal strategies. Even for special cases of concurrent reachability game,
namely turn-based reachability games, where in each state at most one player can choose
between multiple moves, the best known complexity results are obtained by guessing an
optimal strategy and computing the value in the game obtained after fixing the guessed
strategy. A strategy has patience p if p is the inverse of the smallest non-zero probability
used by a distribution describing the strategy. A rational valued strategy has roundedness
q if q is the greatest denominator of the probabilities used by the distributions describing
the strategy. Note that if a strategy has roundedness q, then it also has patience at most
q. The description complexity of a stationary strategy can be bounded by the roundedness.
A stationary strategy with exponential roundedness, can be described using polynomially
many bits, whereas the explicit description of stationary strategies with doubly-exponential
patience is not polynomial. Thus obtaining upper bounds on the roundedness and lower
bounds on the patience is at the heart of the computational complexity analysis of concurrent
reachability games. Also see [27, 28, 24] for the significance of computing strategies in
concurrent stochastic games.
1 The square-root sum problem is an important problem from computational geometry, where given a
set of natural numbers n1, n2, . . . , nk, the question is whether the sum of the square roots exceed an
integer b. The problem is not known to be in NP.
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Previous results and our contributions
In this work we consider concurrent reachability games. We first describe the relevant
previous results and then our contributions.
Previous results
For concurrent reachability game, the optimal bound on patience and roundedness for
ε-optimal strategies for the reachability player, for ε > 0, is doubly exponential [13, 12].
The doubly-exponential lower bound is obtained by presenting a family of games (namely,
Purgatory) where the reachability player requires doubly-exponential patience (however, in
this game the patience of the safety player is 1) [13, 12]; whereas the doubly-exponential
upper bound is obtained by expressing the values in the existential theory of reals [13, 12].
In contrast to the reachability player that in general do not have optimal strategies, similar
to the safety player there are two related classes of concurrent stochastic games that admit
optimal stationary strategies, namely, discounted-sum, and ergodic concurrent games. For
both these classes the optimal bound on patience and roundedness for ε-optimal strategies,
for ε > 0, is exponential [5, 15]. The optimal bound on patience and roundedness for optimal
and ε-optimal strategies, for ε > 0, for the safety player has been an open problem.
Our contributions
Our main results are as follows:
1. Lower bound: general. We show that in concurrent reachability games, a lower bound on
patience of optimal and ε-optimal strategies, for ε > 0, for the safety player is doubly
exponential (in contrast to the above mentioned related classes of games that only require
exponential patience). We present a family of games (namely, Purgatory Duel) where
optimal and ε-optimal strategies, for ε > 0, for both players require doubly-exponential
patience.
2. Lower bound: three states. We show that even in concurrent reachability games with three
states of which two are absorbing (sink states with only self-loop transitions) the patience
required for optimal and ε-optimal strategies, for ε > 0, is exponential (in the number of
actions). An optimal (resp., ε-optimal, for ε > 0) strategy in a game with three states
(with two absorbing states) is basically an optimal (resp., ε-optimal) strategy of a matrix
game, where some entries of the matrix game depend on the value of the non-absorbing
state (as some transitions of the non-absorbing state can lead to itself). In standard
matrix games, the patience for ε-optimal strategies, for ε > 0, is only logarithmic [17];
and perhaps surprisingly in contrast we show that the patience for ε-optimal strategies
in concurrent reachability games with only three states is exponential (i.e., there is a
doubly-exponential increase from logarithmic to exponential).
3. Upper bound. We show that in concurrent reachability games, an upper bound on the
patience of optimal strategies and an upper bound on the patience and roundedness
of ε-optimal strategies, for ε > 0, is as follows: (a) doubly exponential in general; and
(b) exponential for the safety player if the number of value classes (i.e., the number of
different values in the game) is constant. Hence our upper bounds on roundedness match
our lower bound results for patience. Our results also imply that if the number of value
classes is constant, then the basic decision problem is in coNP.
In summary, we present a complete picture of the patience and roundedness required in
concurrent reachability games.
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Table 1 Strategy complexity (i.e., patience and roundedness of ε-optimal strategies, for ε > 0) of
the reachability vs safety player depending on the number of value classes. Our results are bold
faced, and LB (resp., UB) denotes lower (resp., upper) bound on patience (resp., roundedness).
# Value classes Reachability Safety
1 Linear One
2 Double-exponential One
3 Double-exponential Exponential
LB, Theorem 13
Constant Double-exponential Exponential
UB, Theorem 14
General Double-exponential Double-exponential
LB, Theorem 12
UB, Theorem 14
Distinguishing aspects of safety and reachability
While the optimal bound on patience and roundedness we establish in concurrent reachab-
ility games for the safety player matches that for the reachability player, there are many
distinguishing aspects for safety as compared to reachability in terms of the number of value
classes (as shown in Table 1). For the reachability player, if there is one value class, then the
patience and roundedness required is linear: it follows from the results of [2] that if there
is one value class then all the values must be either 1 or 0; and if all states have value 0,
then any strategy is optimal, and if all states have value 1, then it follows from [8, 3] that
there is an almost-sure winning strategy (that ensures the objective with probability 1)
from all states and the optimal bound on patience and roundedness is linear. The family of
game graphs defined by Purgatory has two value classes, and the reachability player requires
doubly exponential patience and roundedness, even for two value classes. In contrast, if there
are (at most) two value classes, then again the values are 1 and 0; and in value class 1, the
safety player has an optimal strategy that is stationary and deterministic (i.e., a positional
strategy) and has patience and roundedness 1 [8], and in value class 0 any strategy is optimal.
While for two value classes, the patience and roundedness is 1 for the safety player, we
show that for three value classes (even for three states) the patience and roundedness is
exponential, and in general the patience and roundedness is doubly exponential (and such a
finer characterization does not exist for the reachability player).
Our main ideas
Our most interesting results are the doubly-exponential and exponential lower bound on the
patience and roundedness. We now present a brief overview about the lower bound example.
The game of Purgatory [13, 12] is a concurrent reachability game that was defined as an
example showing that the reachability player must, in order to play near optimally, use a
strategy with non-zero probabilities that are doubly exponentially small in the number of
states of the game (i.e., the patience is doubly exponential).
In this paper we present another example of a reachability game where this is the case for
the safety player as well. The game Purgatory consists of a (potentially infinite) sequence
of escape attempts. In an escape attempt one player is given the role of the escapee and
the other player is given the role as the guard. An escape attempt consists of at most N
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rounds. In each round, the guard selects and hides a number between 1 and m, and the
escapee must try to guess the number. If the escapee successfully guesses the number N
times, the game ends with the escapee as the winner. If the escapee incorrectly guesses a
number which is strictly larger than the hidden number, the game ends with the guard as
the winner. Otherwise, if the escapee incorrectly guesses a number which is strictly smaller
than the hidden number, the escape attempt is over and the game continues.
The game of Purgatory is such that the reachability player is always given the role of the
escapee, and the safety player is always given the role of the guard. If neither player wins
during an escape attempt (meaning there is an infinite number of escape attempts) the safety
player wins. Purgatory may be modeled as a concurrent reachability game consisting of N
non-absorbing positions in which each player has m actions. The value of each non-absorbing
position is 1. This means that the reachability player has, for any ε > 0, a stationary strategy
that wins from each non-absorbing position with probability at least 1 − ε [10], but such
strategies must have doubly-exponential patience. In fact for N sufficiently large and m ≥ 2,
such strategies must have patience at least 2mN/3 for ε = 1− 4m−N/2 [12]. For the safety
player however, the situation is simple: any strategy is optimal.
We introduce a game we call the Purgatory Duel in which the safety player must also use
strategies of doubly-exponential patience to play near optimally. The main idea of the game
is that it forces the safety player to behave as a reachability player. We can describe the new
game as a variation on the above description of the Purgatory game. The Purgatory Duel
consists also of a (potentially infinite) sequence of escape attempts. But now, before each
escape attempt the role of the escapee is given to each player with probability 12 , and in each
escape attempt the rules are as described above. The game remains asymmetric in the sense
that if neither player wins during an escape attempt, the safety player wins. The Purgatory
Duel may be modeled as a concurrent reachability game consisting of 2N + 1 non-absorbing
positions, in which each player has m actions, except for a single position where the players
each have just a single action.
Technical contributions
The key non-trivial aspects of our proof are as follows: first, is to come up with the family of
games, namely, Purgatory Duel, where the ε-optimal strategies, for ε ≥ 0, for the players
are symmetric, even though the objectives are complementary; and then the precise analysis
of the game needs to combine and extend several ideas, such as refined analysis of matrix
games, and analysis of perturbed Markov decision processes (MDPs) which are one-player
stochastic games.
Highlights
We highlight two features of our results, namely, the surprising aspects and the significance
(see Section Discussion and Conclusion of the full version for further details).
1. Surprising aspects. The first surprising aspect of our result is the doubly-exponential lower
bound for the safety player in concurrent reachability games. The properties of strategies
for the safety player in concurrent reachability games resemble concurrent discounted
games, as in both cases optimal stationary strategies exist, and locally optimal strategies
are optimal. We show that in contrast to concurrent discounted games where exponential
patience suffices for the safety player in concurrent reachability games doubly-exponential
patience is necessary. The second surprising aspect is the lower bound example itself.
The lower bound example is obtained as follows: (i) given Purgatory we first obtain
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simplified Purgatory by changing the start state such that it deterministically goes to the
next state; (ii) we then consider its dual where the roles of the players are exchanged;
and (iii) Purgatory duel is obtained by merging the start states of simplified Purgatory
and its dual. Both in simplified Purgatory and its dual, there are only two value classes,
and positional optimal strategies exist for the safety player. Surprisingly we show that
a simple merge operation gives a game with linear number of value classes and the
patience increases from 1 to doubly-exponential. Finally, the properties of strategies for
the reachability- and safety-player in concurrent reachability games differ substantially.
An important aspect of our lower bound example is that we show how to modify an
example for the reachability player to obtain the result for safety player.
2. Significance. Our most important results are the lower bounds, and the main significance
is threefold. First, the most well-studied way to obtain computational complexity result
in games is to explicitly guess strategies, and then verify the game obtained fixing the
strategy. The lower bound for the reachability player by itself did not rule out that better
complexity results can be obtained through better strategy complexity for the safety player
(indeed, for constant number of value classes, we obtain a better complexity result than
known before due to the exponential bound on roundedness). Our doubly-exponential
lower bound shows that in general the method of explicitly guessing strategies would
require exponential space, and would not yield NP or coNP upper bounds. Second, one of
the most well-studied algorithm for games is the strategy-iteration algorithm. Our result
implies that any natural variant of the strategy-iteration algorithm for the safety player
that explicitly compute strategies require exponential space in the worst-case. Finally, in
games, strategies that are witness to the values and specify how to play the game, are as
important as values, and our results establish the precise strategy complexity (matching
upper bound of roundedness with lower bounds of patience).
Full-version: Proofs and non-zero-sum games.
In the full version [4], we give full proofs of all our lemmas and also consider non-zero-sum
and non-two-player concurrent games, but where each player has either a reachability or
safety objective (concurrent reachability games is then the special case of 1 player with a
reachability objective and 1 player with the complementary safety objective).
2 Definitions
Other number
Given a number i ∈ {1, 2} let î be the other number, i.e., if i = 1, then î = 2 and vice-versa.
Probability distributions
A probability distribution d over a finite set Z, is a map d : Z → [0, 1], such that∑z∈Z d(z) = 1.
Fix a probability distribution d over a set Z. The distribution d is pure (Dirac) if d(z) = 1
for some z ∈ Z and for convenience we overload the notation and let d = z. The support
Supp(d) is the subset Z ′ of Z, such that z ∈ Z ′ if and only if d(z) > 0. The distribution d
is totally mixed if Supp(d) = Z. The patience of d is maxz∈Supp(d) 1d(z) , i.e., the inverse of
the minimum non-zero probability. The roundedness of d, if d(z) is a rational number for all
z ∈ Z, is the greatest denominator of d(z). Note that roundness of d is always at least the
patience of d. Given two elements z, z′ ∈ Z, the probability distribution d = U(z, z′) over Z
is such that d(z) = d(z′) = 12 . Let ∆(Z) be the set of all probability distributions over Z.
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Concurrent reachability games
A concurrent reachability game, consists of (1) a finite set of states S, of size N ; and (2) for
each state s ∈ S and each player i a set Ais of actions (and Ai =
⋃
sA
i
s is the set of all actions
for player i, for each i; and A =
⋃
iA
i is the set of all actions) such that Ais consists of at
most m actions; and (3) a stochastic transition function δ : S ×A1 ×A2 → ∆(S); and (4) a
designated goal state g ∈ S. A state s is deterministic if δ(s, a1, a2) is pure (deterministic), for
all ai ∈ Ais and for all i. A state s is called absorbing if Ais = {a} for all i and δ(s, a, a) = s.
The number δmin is the smallest non-zero transition probability.
How to play a concurrent reachability game
The game G, starting in state s, is played as follows: initially a pebble is placed on
v0 := s. In each time step T ≥ 0, the pebble is on some state vT and each player selects
(simultaneously and independently of the other players, like in the game rock-paper-scissors)
an action aiT+1 ∈ AivT . Then, the game selects vT+1 according to the probability distribution
δ(vT , a1T+1, a2T+1) and moves the pebble onto vT+1. The game then continues with time step
T + 1 (i.e., the game consists of infinitely many time steps). For a round T , let aT+1 be the
pair of choices of the actions for the players, i.e., aT+1,i is the choice of player i, for each i.
Round 0 is identified by v0 and round T > 0 is then identified by the pair (aT , vT ). A play Ps,
starting in state v0 = s, is then a sequence of rounds (v0, (a1, v1), (a2, v2), . . . , (aT , vT ), . . . ),
and for each ` a prefix of P `s of length ` is then (v0, (a1, v1), (a2, v2), . . . , (aT , vT ), . . . , (a`, v`)),
and we say that P `s ends in v`. Player 1 wins a play Ps iff vT = g for some T . Similarly,
player 2 wins a play Ps iff vT 6= g for all T We refer to player 1 as the reachability player
and player 2 as the safety player.
Strategies
Fix a player i. A strategy is a recipe to choose a probability distribution over actions given a
finite prefix of a play. Formally, a strategy σi for player i is a map from P `s , for a play Ps
of length ` starting at state s, to a distribution over Aiv` . Player i follows a strategy σi, if
given the current prefix of a play is P `s , he selects a`+1 according to σi(P `s ), for all plays Ps
starting at s and all lengths `. A strategy σi for player i, is stationary, if for all ` and `′,
and all pair of plays Ps and P ′s′ , starting at states s and s′ respectively, such that P `s and
(P ′)`′s′ ends in the same state t, we have that σi(P `s ) = σi((P ′)`
′
s′); and we write σi(t) for the
unique distribution used for prefix of plays ending in t. The patience (resp., roundedness)
of a strategy σi is the supremum of the patience (resp. roundedness) of the distribution
σi(P `s ), over all plays Ps starting at state s, and all lengths `. Also, a strategy σi is pure
(resp., totally mixed) if σi(P `s ) is pure (resp., totally mixed), for all plays Ps starting at s
and all lengths `. A strategy is positional if it is pure and stationary. Let Σi be the set of all
strategies for player i.
Strategy profiles
A strategy profile σ = (σ1, σ2) is a pair of strategies, one for each player. A strategy profile σ
defines a unique probability measure on plays, denoted Prσ, when the players follow their
respective strategies [25]. We say that a strategy profile has a property (e.g., is stationary) if
each of the strategies in the profile has that property.
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Values
Let u(G, s, σ) be the probability that player 1 wins the game G when the players follow σ
and the play starts in s (i.e., the utility or payoff for player 1). Also if the game G is clear
from context we drop it from the notation. Given a concurrent reachability game G, the
upper value val(G, s) (resp., lower value val(G, s)) of G starting in s is
val(G, s) = sup
σ1∈Σ1
inf
σ2∈Σ2
u(G, s, σ1, σ2) ; val(G, s) = inf
σ2∈Σ2
sup
σ1∈Σ1
u(G, s, σ1, σ2) .
As shown by [10] we have that val(G, s) := val(G, s) = val(G, s); which is called the value of
s. We will sometimes write val(s) for val(G, s) if G is clear from the context. We will also
write val for the vector where vals = val(s).
(ε-)optimal strategies for concurrent reachability games
For an ε ≥ 0, a strategy σ1 for player 1 (resp., σ2 for player 2) is called ε-optimal if for each
state s we have that val(s)−ε ≤ infσ2∈Σ2 u(s, σ1, σ2) (resp., val(s)+ε ≥ supσ1∈Σ1 u(s, σ1, σ2)).
For each i, a strategy σi for player i is called optimal if it is 0-optimal. There exist concurrent
reachability games in which player 1 does not have optimal strategies, see [10] for an example.
On the other hand in all concurrent reachability games G player 1 has a stationary ε-optimal
strategy for each ε > 0. In all concurrent reachability games player 2 has an optimal
stationary strategy (thus also an ε-optimal stationary strategy for all ε > 0) [20, 14]. Also,
given a stationary strategy σ1 for player 1 we have that there exists a positional strategy
σ2, such that u(s, σ1, σ2) = infσ′2∈Σ2 u(s, σ1, σ
′
2), i.e., we only need to consider positional
strategies for player 2. Similarly, we only need to consider positional strategies for player 1,
if we are given a stationary strategy for player 2.
Markov decision processes and Markov chains
For each player i, a Markov decision process (MDP) for player i is a concurrent game where
the size of Ajs is 1 for all s and j 6= i. A Markov chain is an MDP for each player (that is
the size of Ajs is 1 for all s and j). A closed recurrent set of a Markov chain G is a maximal
(i.e., no closed recurrent set is a subset of another) set S′ ⊆ S such that for all pairs of states
s, s′ ∈ S, the play starting at s reaches state s′ eventually with probability 1 (note that it
does not depend on the choices of the players as we have a Markov chain). For all starting
states, eventually a closed recurrent set is reached with probability 1, and then plays stay in
the closed reccurent set. Observe that fixing a stationary strategy for all but one player in a
concurrent game, the resulting game is an MDP for the remaining player. Hence, fixing a
stationary strategy for each player gives a Markov chain.
Game illustration
When we illustrate our games, we illustrate each state as a matrix, where the rows corresponds
to the actions of the reachability player, the columns corresponds to the actions of the safety
player. Thus, each entry e corresponds to an pair of actions (i, j) and a state s and we have
an edge to δ(s, i, j) from e.
3 Patience Lower Bound
In this section we will establish the doubly-exponential lower bound on patience for concurrent
reachability games. First we define the game family, namely, Purgatory Duel and we also
recall the family Purgatory.
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>
v12
v11
vs
v21
v22
⊥
(a) Illustration of the Purgatory Duel withm = n = 2.
The dashed edges have probability 12 each.
>
v2
v1
⊥
(b) Illustration of Purgatory with m =
n = 2.
Figure 1 Illustration of the games used for lower bounds.
The Purgatory Duel
In this paper we specifically focus on the following concurrent reachability game, the Purgatory
Duel, defined on a pair of parameters (n,m). The game consists of N = 2n+ 3 states, namely
{v11 , v12 , . . . , v1n, v21 , v22 , . . . , v2n, vs,>,⊥} and all but vs are deterministic. To simplify the
definition of the game, let v10 = v2n+1 = ⊥ and v20 = v1n+1 = >. The states > and ⊥ are
absorbing. For each i ∈ {1, 2} and j ∈ {1, . . . , n}, the state vij is such that A1vi
j
= A2
vi
j
=
{1, 2, . . . ,m} and for each a1, a2 we have that δ(vj , a1, a2) is (1) vs if a1 > a2, (2) vi0 if
a1 < a2 and (3) vij+1 if a1 = a2. Finally, A1vs = A
2
vs = {a} and δ(vs, a, a) = U(v11 , v21). There
is an illustration of the Purgatory Duel with m = n = 2 in Figure 1a.
The game Purgatory
We will also use the game Purgatory as defined by [12] (and also in [13] for the case of m = 2).
Purgatory is similar to the Purgatory Duel and hence the similarity in names. Purgatory is
also defined on a pair of parameters (n,m). The game consists of N = n+ 2 states, namely,
{v1, v2, . . . , vn,>,⊥} and each state is deterministic. To simplify the definition of the game,
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let vn+1 = >. For each j ∈ {1, . . . , n}, the state vj is such that A1vj = A2vj = {1, 2, . . . ,m}
and for each a1, a2 we have that δ(vj , a1, a2) is (1) v1 if a1 > a2, (2) ⊥ if a1 < a2 and (3) vj+1
if a1 = a2. The states > and ⊥ are absorbing. Furthermore, S1 = {>}. For an illustration
of Purgatory with m = n = 2 see Figure 1b.
3.1 The patience of optimal strategies
In this section we present an approximation of the values of the states and the patience of
the optimal strategies in the Purgatory Duel. We first show that the values of the states
(besides > and ⊥) are strictly between 0 and 1.
I Lemma 1. Each state v ∈ {v11 , v12 , . . . , v1n, v21 , v22 , . . . , v12 , vs} is such that val(v) ∈ [ 1mn+2 , 1−
1
mn+2 ]
The proof of the above lemma is obtained by considering the strategy, for either player, that
plays uniformly at random all available actions at every state. Next we show that every
optimal stationary strategy for player 2 must be totally mixed.
I Lemma 2. Let σ2 be an optimal stationary strategy for player 2. The distribution σ2(vij)
is totally mixed and val(v1j ) > val(vs) > val(v2j ), for all i, j.
Next, we show that if either player follows a stationary strategy that is totally mixed on
at least one side (that is, if there is an i′, such that for each j the stationary strategy plays
totally mixed in vi′j ), then eventually either > or ⊥ is reached with probability 1. The proof
relies on the analysis of the Markov chain obtained given the strategies.
I Lemma 3. For any i and i′, let σi be a stationary strategy for player i, such that σi(vi
′
j )
is totally mixed for all j. Let σ̂
i
be some stationary strategy for the other player. Then, each
closed recurrent set in the Markov chain given by the game, σi, and σ̂i, consists of only the
state > or only the state ⊥.
The following definition basically “mirrors” a strategy σi for player i, for each i and gives
it to the other player. We show (in Lemma 5) that if σ2 is optimal for player 2, then the
mirror strategy is optimal for player 1. We also show that if σ2 is an ε-optimal strategy for
player 2, for 0 < ε < 13 , then so is the mirror strategy for player 1 (in Lemma 8).
I Definition 4 (Mirror strategy). Given a stationary strategy σi for player i, for either i, let
the mirror strategy σσi
î
for player î be the stationary strategy where σσi
î
(vî′j ) = σi(vi
′
j ) for
each i′ and j.
We next show that player 1 has optimal stationary strategies in the Purgatory Duel and
give expressions for the values.
I Lemma 5. Let σ2 be some optimal stationary strategy for player 2. Then the mirror
strategy σσ21 is optimal for player 1. We have val(vs) = 12 and val(vij) = 1− val(v̂ij), for all
i, j.
Finally, we give an approximation of the values of states in the Purgatory Duel and a
lower bound on the patience of any optimal strategy of 2(m−1)2mn−2 .
I Theorem 6. For each j in {1, . . . , n}, the value of state v1j in the Purgatory Duel is less
than 12 + 2(1−m)·m
n−j−1 and for any optimal stationary strategy σi for either player i, the
patience of σi(v1j ) is at least 2(m−1)
2mn−j−1 .
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3.2 The patience of ε-optimal strategies
In this section we consider the patience of ε-optimal strategies for 0 < ε < 13 . First we argue
that each such strategy for player 2 is totally mixed on one side.
I Lemma 7. For all 0 < ε < 12 , each ε-optimal stationary strategy σ2 for player 2 is such
that σ2(v2j ) is totally mixed, for all j.
The idea is that against any strategy σ2 that does not play totally mixed in some v2j , player 1
can ensure that if v21 is entered, then ⊥ is not reached before vs is entered again (by playing
1 in v2j′ , for j′ < j and some action not played by σ2 in v2j ). This allows player 1 to play a
near optimal strategy from Purgatory in the states v1j′ , ensuring that > is eventually reached
with probability close to 1 from vs and showing that σ2 is far from optimal. We now show
that if we mirror an ε-optimal strategy, then we get an ε-optimal strategy.
I Lemma 8. For all 0 < ε < 13 , each ε-optimal stationary strategy σ2 for player 2 in the
Purgatory Duel, is such that the mirror strategy σσ21 is ε-optimal for player 1.
Next we give a definition and a lemma, which is similar to Lemma 6 in [16]. The purpose
of the lemma is to identify certain cases where one can change the transition function of an
MDP in a specific way and obtain a new MDP with larger values.
I Definition 9. Let G be an MDP for a safety player. A replacement set is a set of triples of
states, actions and distributions over the states Q = {(s1, a1, δ1), . . . , (s`, a`, δ`)}. Given the
replacement set Q, the MDP G[Q] is an MDP over the same states as G, with the same set
of safe states, and where the transition function δ′ is similar to δ, except that δ′(s, a) = δi if
s = si and a = ai for some i.
I Lemma 10. Let G be an MDP with a safety player. Consider some replacement set
Q = {(s1, a1, δ1), . . . , (s`, a`, δ`)}, such that for all t and i we have that
∑
s∈S(δ(si, ai)(s) ·
vts) ≤
∑
s∈S(δi(s) · vts). Let v′
t be the value vector for G[Q] with finite horizon t. (1) For
all states s and time limits t we have that vts ≤ v′
t
s. (2) For all states s, we have that
val(G, s) ≤ val(G[Q], s).
The proof of the lemma is in the full version [4]. We next show that for player 1, the patience
of ε-optimal strategies is high.
I Lemma 11. For all 0 < ε < 13 , each ε-optimal stationary strategy σ1 for player 1 in the
Purgatory Duel has patience at least 2mΩ(n) . For N = 5 the patience is 2Ω(m).
The proof of the lemma is in the full version
We present the main theorem of this section. The proof follows easily from the previous
lemmas (and is presented in details in the full version [4]).
I Theorem 12. For all 0 < ε < 13 , every ε-optimal stationary strategy, for either player, in
the Purgatory Duel (that has N = 2n+ 3 states and at most m actions for each player at all
states) has patience 2mΩ(n) . For N = 5 the patience is 2Ω(m).
3.3 The patience lower bound for three states
We show that the patience of all ε-optimal strategies, for all 0 < ε < 13 , for both players
in a concurrent reachability game G with three states of which two are absorbing, and the
non-absorbing state has m actions for each player, can be as large as 2Ω(m). The key steps of
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the proof are as follows: (1) First we consider the Purgatory duel with n = 1, and compress
it down to 3 states by considering two steps of the Purgatory Duel in a single step. This
gives us a game that has three states with one non-absorbing state (which we call 3-state
Purgatory Duel) where ε-optimal strategies for the players require exponential patience in
m. However, since two steps are simulated by a single step, this game increases the number
of actions M from m to m2. Hence, our patience bound for 3-state Purgatory Duel is only
2Ω(
√
M). (2) We then show that we can restrict the above game to 2m− 1 of the m2 actions
and still get the same patience as a function of m. We refer to this game as the restricted
3-state Purgatory Duel. Formally, we establish the following result.
I Theorem 13. For all 0 < ε < 13 , every ε-optimal stationary strategy, for either player, in
the restricted 3-state Purgatory Duel (that has three states, two of which are absorbing, and
the non-absorbing state has O(m) actions for each player) has patience 2Ω(m).
4 Patience Upper Bound
In this section we present the upper bounds. The values of concurrent reachability games
can be expressed in the existential theory of reals. Using a refined analysis we present a
formula where the number of variables depends only on the number of value classes, rather
than the number of states. Using techniques similarly to [13] (such as quantifier elimination,
sampling, and root separation for analysis of strategies in games), for concurrent reachability
games with K value classes, we show that there is an optimal stationary strategy for the
safety player where each probability is a real algebraic number, defined by a polynomial of
degree mO(K2) and the maximum coefficient bit-size is τmO(K2), where τ is the bit-size of
numbers in the input. We obtain the following theorem.
I Theorem 14. For all concurrent reachability games with at most K different value-
classes and probabilities that are rational numbers defined using at most τ bits, the following
hold:
1. For all ε > 0, there exists an ε-optimal stationary strategy with roundedness at most
1
ε lg
1
ε2Nτm
O(K2) .
2. For a fixed constant K, a state s and a number λ, given in binary, the problem of deciding
whether val(s) ≥ λ is in coNP.
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